3 Army of the Patriotic War. Great War Rating. who are the best army commanders of the Red Army? Polish campaign of the Red Army

The battles in the Bolkhov direction in the winter-spring of 1942 have been little studied. As a rule, fights are characterized as "senseless slaughter", etc. expressions. At the same time, they are based on the fact that the goals of the operation were not achieved, and the losses of the Red Army were large, and the enemy “did not notice” these battles.

Considering that the majority of the ski battalions of the Bryansk Front fought in the 3rd Army, I will try to consider these battles in a little more detail. This article is not a review of the Bolkhov-Mtsensk offensive operation from January 8 to April 20, 1942 as a whole, but only the battles of the 3rd Army from February to April. We can assume that this is a chronology of events in the 3rd Army band from February to April 1942. Professional historians may disagree.

I'll start a little from afar. Why were these fights forgotten? The answer is simple - the stated goals were not achieved - the Oryol grouping of the enemy could not be destroyed, Orel and Bryansk could not be taken. Losses were great. Therefore, the military leaders who fought on the Bryansk front had a failure in their memoirs. So the commander of the 3rd army P.I. Batov in his memoirs limited himself to one phrase, that he was the commander of the 3rd army for a month.

Historians have also avoided these battles. There were no high-profile victories or high-profile defeats. Unless those who like to pour mud on everything, did not bypass these fights. Unfortunately, there may be objective studies, but I have not yet met them.

So 3 army

In December, the 3rd Army, together with units of the Southwestern Front, carried out an excellent Yelets offensive operation. Then it advanced on the Bolkhovsky direction. At the onset, starting from December, no new connections were received. In December, on the contrary, the cavalry divisions were taken away from it, and only at the end of January the army received 287 SD. According to Cherevichenko's report, both armies 3 and 13, together for 200 km of the front, as of 8.1.42 had: 4500 bayonets,
117 heavy machine guns, 149 light machine guns, 47 mortars, 82 divisional artillery guns, 19 regimental and 45 mm guns. In fact, this is not a front, but a reinforced division - what the Germans in their memoirs defined as the absolute superiority of the Russians in numbers.
The combat strength of the divisions of both the 3rd and 13th armies was 400-800 people.

In early January 1942, the 3rd Army began to fight at the turn of the Zusha and Oka rivers.

What was the Bryansk Front, which included the 3rd Army, was well described in his memoirs by the Chief of Staff of the Bryansk Front Kazakov.

« The Bryansk Front then included three armies: the 61st, 3rd and 13th, in which there were up to twenty rifle divisions. The operational formation of our troops was here in one echelon with small army reserves. The front reserve was represented by two cavalry corps, each consisting of three divisions. There were no infantry in the front reserve at all.
The most numerous was the 61st Army, commanded by Lieutenant General M. M. Popov. It operated on medium-rough terrain, without natural obstacles, occupying up to 70 kilometers along the front.
The troops of the 3rd Army were located at the turn of the Oka and Zusha rivers, with a front of up to 120 kilometers. This army was commanded by Lieutenant General P.I. Batov.
The 13th Army, under the command of Major General N.P. Pukhov, fought on the Novosil, Vyshe-Dolgoye front with a total length of 110 kilometers.
The neighboring 40th Army of the South-Western Front, which later also retreated to us, had a front of a little over 100 kilometers, stretching across completely open terrain, without any natural barriers. It was commanded by Lieutenant General M.A. Parsegov.
When studying the situation, I could not help but pay attention to the fact that in our front headquarters and in the headquarters of the armies no one seriously showed concern for the creation of second echelons, and the troops of the first echelon did not have real defensive structures.
I would like to say about one more “disease” that some generals and officers of the front and army departments suffered at that time - this is a passion for private operations with limited goals.

Nevertheless, private operations completely captivated me from the very first days of taking office. All of them required time to prepare. All were associated with losses in personnel and large expenditures of material resources. It is significant that the main flow of reinforcements was sent to the 3rd Army, where such operations were carried out more often than in others. In January, for example, eight ski battalions were sent to the troops of this army - out of fourteen received by us, and six marching companies - out of ten that arrived on the Bryansk Front..»

What was the enemy

« In the zone of the Bryansk Front, the enemy had a rather large grouping. It consisted of more than twenty divisions, including three armored and three motorized. In October-November 1941, a significant part of these troops under the command of Guderian unsuccessfully tried to capture Tula. Now they were located in the area of ​​Orel and Mtsensk. To the south were units of the 2nd German Army.
The enemy has not yet managed to create a solid defense. He used villages and cities with stone buildings as strongholds. The abundance and quality factor of such buildings created certain advantages for the defending German units.»
Summarizing the position of the troops before the start of the February battles, one can see an approximate equality of forces, twenty rifle divisions against 20 enemy divisions that were on the defensive. At the same time, the enemy had 3 tank - 4,17,18 TD, of which there were two 17 and 4 TD near Bolkhov. and two motorized divisions 25 and 29 MD and a motorized SS regiment "Grossdeutschland", all formations near Bolkhov. The presence of armored and motorized divisions meant that the enemy could quickly transfer moving units to the breakthrough area and counterattack. The tank and motorized divisions of the enemy also had strong artillery with a caliber of up to 210 mm inclusive. If some of the enemy divisions were weakened in previous battles, but our units, for the most part, went through the encirclement of the summer-autumn of 1941 and conducted offensives in December and January and were few in number, as already mentioned earlier.
The statement that the enemy did not create a strong defense is also not entirely clear. The Germans stated that along the Tim-Belev line (along the TIM-ZUSHA-OKA rivers and the cut-off position on the Vyrka River), they had a prepared fortified winter position. So the 3rd Army had to storm the enemy's fairly well-prepared positions, which he had been preparing since the beginning of December 1941. 61st Army advanced partly around the fortified line.
The receipt of 14 ski battalions in January is rather doubtful, so far only two 100 and 101 ski battalions are known that are listed as part of the front, but this possibility cannot be completely ruled out.
The story about "private" operations is not tenable. Firstly, the command of the Bryansk Front practically withdrew itself from the command of the front, switching all its attention to the direction of the 3rd Army. Secondly, the direction of the 3rd army was not very convenient for the offensive - to force Zusha and Oka and break through the heavily fortified enemy defenses. For a private operation, it would be more logical to surround and take Mtsensk, and then move directly to Orel. But if we take into account that the strikes of the 3rd Army were supposed to lead to the defeat of the enemy's Bolkhov grouping, only in cooperation with the 61st Army of the Western Front, then everything becomes clear. In the third, the operation went on for a long time, almost three months, and in terms of timing it practically coincided with the general winter offensive. Fourthly, the Headquarters could hardly ignore the large enemy grouping on the flank of the Western Front. The enemy, taking advantage of the passivity of our troops, could easily organize a counterattack on the flank and rear of the strike force of the Western Front. The events near Sukhinichi confirm this. The German counterattack was not developed not only because the 16th and 10th armies stubbornly resisted, but also because the 3rd and 61st armies were conducting offensive battles in the Mtsensk-Bolkhov directions. The events of August 1942 once again confirmed that the Oryol salient was extremely dangerous. So, most likely, the operation of the 3rd army was carried out with the sanction and by order of the Headquarters. The frequent change of commanders also indicates that they were simply torn off evil for failure. And in early April, organizational conclusions followed on the commander of the Bryansk Front, he was removed from his post with a demotion, not because of the failure of a private army operation. The reference to the fact that the operation was private arose, most likely, due to the failure of the operation.
It should be noted one more feature that had a negative impact on the results of the battles near Bolkhov. The 3rd Army was part of the Bryansk Front, and the 61st Army was either part of the Bryansk, then part of the Western, then again the Bryansk Fronts. Considering that the Bryansk Front was subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction (for which the Bolkhov direction was a bearish corner), and the Western Front was subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the Western direction, it was extremely difficult to organize the interaction of the two armies. Moreover, three commanders have changed in the army in three months. Lieutenant General Pshennikov P.S. - hit a mine. Lieutenant General Batov P. I. - removed from his post and replaced by Major General Zhmachenko F. F., who was also soon replaced. Both subsequently commanded the armies well, but the change of command during the offensive did not favor the success of the operations. Later, the Headquarters corrected the situation by including 61,3,13,40 armies in the Bryansk Front and subordinating the front directly to the Headquarters, but this happened already in April, time was lost, the units suffered losses and the new offensive did not bring success.
The terrain in front of the 3rd army was also unfavorable for the attackers - the Zusha and Oka rivers had high and steep banks and twisted incredibly, which created a certain benefit for the enemy.
Who opposed 3 and 61 armies.

German operational map of the 2 TA section in the Mtsensk - Bolkhov-Sukhinichi area on February 10, 1942

3rd Army Operations Area
And what was the enemy like? There was no trace of any weak parts experiencing supply difficulties.
The 2nd Panzer Army consisted of the 35th and 53rd Army Corps and 47th, 24 Motorized Corps, which defended on a fairly wide front from Mtsensk to Sukhinichi and Kirov.
The 35th Army Corps was defending in the area of ​​Mtsensk 262, 293 PD and 29 MD.

Further, the 53rd Army Corps adjoined it. in a ledge near Bolkhov 25 MD, 112, 167, 296, 56 PD.
The breakthrough of the 61st Army was held back by the 47th Tank Corps, consisting of the 4th and 17th TDs, the SS Regiment "Grossdeutschland", 134th Infantry Division.
In the area of ​​​​Sukhinichi-Kirov, the 24th tank corps united parts of 208,211,216,339 PD and 18 TD.
Other units were also present, for example, battle groups that are difficult to account for and which were formed from various parts of the rear, the Luftwaffe, the TODT organization, the Imperial Labor Service and other organizations that were not part of the Wehrmacht.
So the largest enemy grouping was in the Bolkhov direction in front of the 3rd and 61st armies - 3 out of 4 corps, 5 out of 6 mobile formations. Directly in front of the 3rd army there were 3 mobile formations - 25, 29 MD and 17 TD.
210 mm gun in position

As well as parts of the RGK artillery reinforcement - for example, the 604 division with 210 mm caliber guns 21cm Mrs 18, actively participated in the battles in the area of ​​​​Mtsensk and the surrounding area, supporting 29 MD and 167 PD. Or 69 artillery regiment RGK with 100 mm guns 10 cm sK 18, supported 53 AK from March 1942.
521 PTBs armed with Panzerjäger I were also present - despite the 47 mm gun, it was equipped with sub-caliber shells and could fight T-34s and KVs from a distance of 500-600 meters.
Not all parts of the Germans were battered, for example, 56 PD arrived at the front only in December 1941. The enemy also noted the good completeness of 134 PD and 4 TD.
The enemy's defense along the Oka River was also strong - three lines of defense, three lines of trenches in each, connected by communication lines. The lines of defense are covered with minefields and barbed wire. Bunkers and dugouts are equipped for life in the winter - there were stoves, bunks and more. Bunkers had from 4 to 12 rolls. Each stronghold consisted of at least 12-15 firing points - machine guns, mortars and anti-tank artillery, the entire defense was supported by heavy artillery fire. The presence of tank units allowed the enemy to quickly transfer them to the threatened direction and launch counterattacks.
The presence in the rear of large junctions of the Bryansk and Orel roads and the Orel-Mtsensk paved highway made it possible for the enemy to easily replenish his units and supply them with everything necessary for battle.

The 3rd army, which had not left the battle for several months, and had not received sufficient reinforcement, had to crack this defense.

".. No. 468. DIRECTIVE OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 3rd ARMY, No. 002140 / ss / s May 14, 1941 Top secret Of particular importance Ex. No. 2

1. Based on the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 503859 / ss / s and the redeployment of units, by May 20, 1941, develop a new plan for covering the state border of the site: lake. Kavishki, Kadysh, Krasne, Augustov, Raigorod, Grajevo, suit. Shchuchyn. The specified plan is given the name: "State border cover area No. 1". I appoint you commander of the troops of the cover area. Sharm - GRODNO.

2. The composition of the troops of the cover area of ​​the state border No. 1 includes: a) Directorate of the 3rd Army; ... Organize the defense of the state border, guided by the following basic guidelines: a) put the stubborn defense of the UR and the field fortifications created along the state border line as the basis for the defense of the troops, using all forces and opportunities for their further development. To give the character of active actions to the defense. Any attempts by the enemy to break through the defense should be immediately eliminated by counterattacks by corps and army reserves; … i) TO CROSS AND OVER THE STATE BORDER - ONLY ON MY SPECIAL ORDER. ... Rear border - former. Soviet-Polish border, up to and including Rubezhevichi. …

7. The procedure for raising units on alert: 1) The following have the right to raise units on alert: a) the People's Commissar of Defense; b) the military council of the district; c) Military Council of the Army; d) Persons who have prescriptions signed only by the people's commissar of defense, or the Military Council of the district; e) Commanders of formations and units, in terms of units subordinate to them. The cipher telegram of the Military Council of the District on the commissioning of this cover plan will be as follows: “To the Commander of the 3rd Army. I declare an alarm for GRODNO 1941. Signatures. You must indicate the following conditional text of the cipher telegram (codegram) for formations and units of the cover area: “To the commander of the corps (division) number. I declare an alarm with the opening of the "red" package. Signatures. 2) Units are raised on alert in compliance with all measures to preserve military secrets ... ... units are concentrated in areas of alert gathering, 3 - 5 km from their quarters, in the most sheltered from air attack and most convenient for columns to march and to carry out combat missions. 3) From the areas of assembly on combat alert, if the order to open the "red" package followed, without waiting for special instructions, they move to the state border, to the areas designated according to the defense plan of the site. In the future, parts of the cover area act according to your order, depending on the situation. 4) In order to reduce the readiness time, the units that are part of the cover area must have: Infantry and cavalry: a) a portable stock of rifle cartridges (90 pieces per rifle) in sealed boxes, under the protection of the duty and orderly, in subunits. Each commander (platoon, company, battalion) determines the procedure for issuing a wearable supply. Issued only on alarm. The transportable supply of propeller cartridges (except for those issued to the hands) is laid out in platoons and companies in sealed boxes, stacks and painted on wagons. In each regiment, battalion, company, squadron, a person must be appointed responsible for their timely and correct loading. b) for each easel machine gun, have 4 tapes stuffed and packed in boxes; on a light machine gun and an automatic machine, 2 disks each. Boxes with stuffed tapes and discs in a SEALED FORM in subdivisions, or in special, protected premises. Periodically refresh disks and cartridges, dry tapes; c) store hand and rifle grenades in sets in the depots of the unit, in special boxes for each unit; d) shells and mines in the amount of 0.25 ammunition in the final equipped form should be stored in sealed and locked limbers and charging boxes, in the parks of units; e) military-chemical, engineering and communication property to store in warehouses parts in sets for each subdivision; e) store the portable supply of food and personal belongings of a fighter in a prepared form for packing in duffel bags and satchels; Moreover, in the warehouses of the unit, store for each unit one daily dacha of food and fodder, prepared for loading into the convoy of the unit; ... h) keep military topographic maps of the emergency reserve glued in sealed bags for each commander, not handing them out until the announcement of GRODNO-41. Before receiving NZ cards, prepare current allowance cards, which are glued together and kept at the headquarters of the unit in sets for units, and issue these cards only on alarm. ... With the announcement of the alarm, the garrisons occupy military installations and are fully prepared for battle, military guards are sent and communications are established. 8) The raising of the units on alarm and their occupation of the sites should be brought to automatism, for which the entire internal routine of the unit should be especially clearly set, the alert service for command personnel should be worked out and checked, the storage of property should ensure its quick issuance to the units. Junior officers, especially foremen, to train in the leadership of their units during the alarm. Unit commanders must know their combat missions and their sectors to perfection in all respects, especially well should study the routes, crossings and lines convenient for deployment and combat. The most probable variants of the tactical solution of combat missions should be worked out by systematic training of command personnel and units at games, field exits and other types of occupations. ... e) Before June 15, 1941, carry out: 1) two exits into the field with the command staff of the units, to the areas outlined according to the plan; 2) one - two training exits on alert of units, with a thorough check of their combat readiness in all respects, with their advancement along the routes outlined according to the plan, without bringing the units to the state border closer than 5 km. Submit the plan-calendar for conducting combat alerts and exercises to me for approval simultaneously with the plan for the cover area.

APPENDIX (only for copy No. 1): 1. The layout of troops in the defense of the 3rd Army, on the map 200,000 - 1 copy. 2. Instructions for hidden management on seven sheets. …

Commander of the ZAPOVO troops General of the Army D. Pavlov Member of the Military Council of the ZAPOVO Corps Commissar Fominykh Chief of Staff of the ZAPOVO Major General Klimovskikh


During the Great Patriotic War, combined arms and tank armies as part of the Red Army were large military formations designed to solve the most complex operational tasks.
In order to effectively manage this army structure, the commander had to have high organizational skills, be well aware of the features of the use of all types of troops that make up his army, but of course, have a strong character.
In the course of hostilities, various military leaders were appointed to the post of army commander, but only the most trained and talented of them remained in it until the end of the war. Most of those who commanded the armies at the end of the Great Patriotic War held lower positions before it began.
Thus, it is known that during the war years, 325 military leaders were in the position of commander of a combined arms army. And the tank armies were commanded by 20 people.
At the beginning, there was a frequent change of tank commanders, for example, the commanders of the 5th tank army were Lieutenant General M.M. Popov (25 days), I.T. Shlemin (3 months), A.I. Lizyukov (33 days, until his death in battle on July 17, 1942), the 1st was commanded (16 days) by artilleryman K.S. Moskalenko, 4th (within two months) - cavalryman V.D. Kryuchenkon and least of all commanded the TA (9 days) - combined arms commander (P.I. Batov).
In the future, the commanders of tank armies during the war years were the most stable group of military leaders. Almost all of them, starting to fight as colonels, successfully commanded tank brigades, divisions, tank and mechanized corps, and in 1942-1943. led tank armies and commanded them until the end of the war. http://www.mywebs.su/blog/history/10032.html

Of the combined arms commanders who ended the war as commanders, 14 people before the war commanded corps, 14 - divisions, 2 - brigades, one - a regiment, 6 were in teaching and command work in educational institutions, 16 officers were staff commanders of various levels, 3 were deputy division commanders and 1 deputy corps commander.

Only 5 generals commanding the armies at the start of the war finished it in the same position: three (N. E. Berzarin, F. D. Gorelenko and V. I. Kuznetsov) - on the Soviet-German front and two more (M. F. Terekhin and L. G. Cheremisov) - on the Far Eastern Front.

In total, 30 commanders from among the army commanders died during the war, of which:

22 people died or died from wounds received in battle,

2 (K. M. Kachanov and A. A. Korobkov) were repressed,

2 (M. G. Efremov and A. K. Smirnov) committed suicide in order to avoid captivity,

2 people died in air (S. D. Akimov) and car accidents (I. G. Zakharkin),

1 (P.F. Alferyev) went missing and 1 (F.A. Ershakov) died in a concentration camp.

For success in planning and carrying out combat operations during the war and immediately after it, 72 commanders from among the commanders were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 9 of them twice. After the collapse of the USSR, two generals were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

During the war years, the Red Army in its composition totaled about 93 combined arms, guards, shock and tank armies, of which were:

1 seaside;

70 combined arms;

11 guards (from 1st to 11th);

5 drums (from 1 to 5);

6 tank guards;

In addition, the Red Army had:

18 air armies (from 1 to 18);

7 air defense armies;

10 sapper armies (from 1 to 10);

In the Independent Military Review of April 30, 2004. the rating of commanders of the Second World War was published, below is an extract from this rating, an assessment of the combat activities of the commanders of the main combined arms and tank Soviet armies:

3. Commanders of combined arms armies.

Chuikov Vasily Ivanovich (1900-1982) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From September 1942 - Commander of the 62nd (8th Guards) Army. Particularly distinguished himself in the Battle of Stalingrad.

Batov Pavel Ivanovich (1897-1985) - army General. Commander of the 51st, 3rd armies, assistant commander of the Bryansk Front, commander of the 65th army.

Beloborodov Afanasy Pavlantievich (1903-1990) - army General. Since the beginning of the war - the commander of a division, a rifle corps. Since 1944 - commander of the 43rd, in August-September 1945 - the 1st Red Banner Army.

Grechko Andrey Antonovich (1903-1976) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From April 1942 - Commander of the 12th, 47th, 18th, 56th Armies, Deputy Commander of the Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) Front, Commander of the 1st Guards Army.

Krylov Nikolay Ivanovich (1903-1972) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From July 1943 he commanded the 21st and 5th armies. He had unique experience in the defense of besieged large cities, being the chief of staff for the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol and Stalingrad.

Moskalenko Kirill Semyonovich (1902-1985) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From 1942 he commanded the 38th, 1st Tank, 1st Guards and 40th Armies.

Pukhov Nikolai Pavlovich (1895-1958) - Colonel General. In 1942-1945. commanded the 13th Army.

Chistyakov Ivan Mikhailovich (1900-1979) - Colonel General. In 1942-1945. commanded the 21st (6th Guards) and 25th armies.

Gorbatov Alexander Vasilyevich (1891-1973) - army General. From June 1943 - Commander of the 3rd Army.

Kuznetsov Vasily Ivanovich (1894-1964) - Colonel General. During the war years, he commanded the troops of the 3rd, 21st, 58th, 1st Guards armies from 1945 - commander of the 3rd shock army.

Luchinsky Alexander Alexandrovich (1900-1990) - army General. Since 1944 - commander of the 28th and 36th armies. He especially distinguished himself in the Belorussian and Manchurian operations.

Ludnikov Ivan Ivanovich (1902-1976) - Colonel General. During the war he commanded a rifle division, a corps, in 1942 he was one of the heroic defenders of Stalingrad. Since May 1944 - commander of the 39th Army, which participated in the Belarusian and Manchurian operations.

Galitsky Kuzma Nikitovich (1897-1973) - army General. Since 1942 - commander of the 3rd shock and 11th guards armies.

Zhadov Alexey Semenovich (1901-1977) - army General. From 1942 he commanded the 66th (5th Guards) Army.

Glagolev Vasily Vasilyevich (1896-1947) - Colonel General. He commanded the 9th, 46th, 31st, in 1945 - the 9th Guards Armies. He distinguished himself in the Battle of Kursk, the Battle of the Caucasus, during the crossing of the Dnieper, the liberation of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Kolpakchi Vladimir Yakovlevich (1899-1961) - army General. He commanded the 18th, 62nd, 30th, 63rd, 69th armies. He acted most successfully in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations.

Pliev Issa Alexandrovich (1903-1979) - army General. During the war years - commander of the guards cavalry divisions, corps, commander of cavalry mechanized groups. He especially distinguished himself by bold and daring actions in the Manchurian strategic operation.

Fedyuninsky Ivan Ivanovich (1900-1977) - army General. During the war years, he was commander of the troops of the 32nd and 42nd armies, the Leningrad Front, the 54th and 5th armies, deputy commander of the Volkhov and Bryansk fronts, commander of the troops of the 11th and 2nd shock armies.

Belov Pavel Alekseevich (1897-1962) - Colonel General. Commanded the 61st Army. He was distinguished by decisive maneuvering actions during the Belorussian, Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations.

Shumilov Mikhail Stepanovich (1895-1975) - Colonel General. From August 1942 until the end of the war, he commanded the 64th Army (from 1943 - the 7th Guards), which, together with the 62nd Army, heroically defended Stalingrad.

Berzarin Nikolai Erastovich (1904-1945) - Colonel General. Commander of the 27th, 34th Armies, Deputy Commander of the 61st, 20th Armies, Commander of the 39th and 5th Shock Armies. He especially distinguished himself by skillful and decisive actions in the Berlin operation.


4. Commanders of tank armies.

Katukov Mikhail Efimovich (1900-1976) - Marshal of the armored forces. One of the founders of the Tank Guard was the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, 1st Guards Tank Corps. Since 1943 - Commander of the 1st Tank Army (since 1944 - Guards).

Bogdanov Semyon Ilyich (1894-1960) - Marshal of the armored forces. Since 1943 he commanded the 2nd (since 1944 - Guards) tank army.

Rybalko Pavel Semyonovich (1894-1948) - Marshal of the armored forces. From July 1942 he commanded the 5th, 3rd and 3rd Guards Tank Armies.

Lelyushenko Dmitry Danilovich (1901-1987) - army General. From October 1941 he commanded the 5th, 30th, 1st, 3rd Guards, 4th Tank (since 1945 - Guards) armies.

Rotmistrov Pavel Alekseevich (1901-1982) - Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces. He commanded a tank brigade, a corps, distinguished himself in the Stalingrad operation. From 1943 he commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army. Since 1944 - Deputy Commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet Army.

Kravchenko Andrey Grigorievich (1899-1963) - Colonel-General of Tank Troops. Since 1944 - commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army. He showed an example of highly maneuverable, swift actions during the Manchurian strategic operation.

It is known that army commanders were selected to this list, who had been in their positions for a relatively long time and showed rather high military leadership abilities.

3rd Army

    Formed in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Vitebsk Army Group of Forces. In September 1939, she participated in the liberation campaign of the Soviet Army in Western Belarus. From the beginning of the war, the army (4th Rifle Corps, 11th Mechanized Corps, 68th UR, a number of artillery and other formations and units) as part of the Western Front fought defensive battles in the regions of Grodno, Lida, Novogrudok (from the end of June - in environment). After leaving the encirclement, she was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and in early August transferred to the Central, from August 25 to the Bryansk Front, in which she participated in the Battle of Smolensk and the Battle of Moscow (from November 11 as part of the South-Western, from December 24 - the Bryansk Front ). Until the summer of 1943, she occupied the defense east of Orel. In July 1943 - February 1944, as part of the Bryansk, from October 7 - Central (from October 20 Belorussian, from February 17, 1944 the 1st Belorussian) fronts, she participated in the Orel, Bryansk, Gomel - Rechitsa and Rogachev - Zhlobin offensive operations. In the summer of 1944, she took part in the Belorussian (from July 5 in the 2nd Belorussian Front), in January - March 1945 in the East Prussian (from February 10 in the 3rd Belorussian Front) offensive operations. At the beginning of April 1945, she was included in the 1st Belorussian Front and participated in the Berlin offensive operation as part of it.

  Commanders:
Kuznetsov V. I. (June - August 1941), lieutenant general
Kreizer Ya. G. (August - December 13, 1941), Major General
Pshennikov P. S. (December 14 - 28, 1941), lieutenant general
Batov P. I. (December 29, 1941 - February 11, 1942), lieutenant general
Zhmachenko F. F. (February 12 - May 1942), major general
Korzun P.P. (May 1942 - June 1943), lieutenant general
Gorbatov F. V. (June 1943 - May 1945), lieutenant general, since the end of June 1944 colonel general
Composition on 01/01/1943:
, , , , , , 79 brigade, 420 aap, 584, 1242 iptap, 139 minp (1 minbr), 474, 475 minp, 6 guards. mp, 1283 zenap, 31, 55 one bepo, 53 pnb, 348 ob(?).
  Literature:
Gorbatov A.V. 3rd Army in the battles for the liberation of Belarus, in the book "Liberation of Belarus. 1944" // - 2nd edition, Moscow, 1974.
Gorbatov A.V. Years and wars.// - Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1965.384 p.
   The book of the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army A.V. Gorbatov, about his life and military service, about the path he traveled from a soldier of the tsarist army to commander-3 during the Great Patriotic War. The main attention is focused on showing the battles near Smolensk, Kharkov, Stalingrad, Orel, Chernigov, Gomel, in Belarus, East Prussia and near Berlin
Beilin P.E. Live, soldier.// - Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1960, 131 p.
   During the Great Patriotic War, the author was a surgeon. A book about the exploits of doctors of the field mobile hospital of the 3rd Army, which took part in the battles near Mtsensk, in the liberation of Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, in the final battles in the Berlin direction.

    |  

25.12.1941 - 1954

The army was formed on December 25, 1941 by transforming the 60th Army (1st formation) as part of the Moscow Defense Zone. Since December 27, as part of the North-Western Front.

From January 21, 1942 as part of the Kalinin Front. In January - February 1942 she took part in the Toropetsko-Kholmskaya operation, in November 1942 - January 1943 - the Velikolukskaya operation, in October - November 1943 - the Nevelsko-Gorodok operation.

Since October 13, 1943, as part of the 2nd Baltic Front. In early 1944, the army fought heavy offensive battles. west and northwest of Nevel, by March 1 went over to the defensive at the turn Balandino, Simanovo, Pustoshka, Denisovo, where she held the lines for more than four months.

From July 1944, the army took part in the Rezhitsko-Dvina offensive operation. On July 10, the troops went on the attack and broke through the front line of the enemy’s defenses. Location on Kharitonov, Naragovo. By the end of July 11, forward formations reached border of the river Alola, bypassing the strongest enemy barriers and bypassing Idritsu from the north- July 12, the city was liberated. On July 17, the army cut Highway Opochka - Sebezh, July 17, army troops liberated Sebezh.

On July 17, 1944, the troops of the 3rd shock army reached the borders of the Latvian SSR, on R. Zilupe. In front of the 3rd shock army, the enemy had a grouping of troops consisting of three infantry divisions (the 329th and 23rd German divisions and the 15th Latvian SS division).

Army troops on the entire front successfully developed the offensive in the general direction of Rezhitsa ( Rezekne) . On July 26, the troops went to railroad line Rezhitsa- Dvinsk ( Daugavpils) . 27 July after fierce fighting Rezhitsa was completely cleared of the Nazi invaders.

In the Rezhitsa-Dvina offensive operation, the troops of the 3rd Shock Army, advancing 140 km, liberated a territory with a total area of ​​​​about 6,000 square meters from the Nazi invaders. km, 3145 settlements (including the cities of Idritsa and Sebezh), assisted the troops of the 10th Guards Army in the liberation Rezhitsa, destroyed 14,750 enemy soldiers and officers, 13 tanks and self-propelled guns, 180 guns and mortars, 203 machine guns, 17 tractors and 70 vehicles, captured about 3,000 people, captured 350 machine guns, 189 guns, 26 tanks, 21 tractors, 72 vehicles and 32 warehouses with ammunition, equipment and food.

Since July 28, the army has been taking part in the Madona operation. The 3rd shock army, which had left by this time to Luban lowland, received an order to overcome it and exit to boundary of the river Aiviekste. The task was set for the army: in cooperation with the 22nd Army, destroy the retreating enemy and capture border r. Aiviekste, exit to boundary of Cesvaine, Madona, Marciena. On the right, the 10th Guards Army advanced, bypassing lake Luban from north and south.

On August 6, the army troops went to boundary of the river Aiviekste, having crossed the river and, having entered the limits Vidzeme upland, by the end of August 13 came out west of Madona. The task of the army was to strike in the general direction to Ergli and in cooperation with the 10th Guards (right) and 22nd (left) armies, defeat the opposing enemy grouping, seize abroad Ergli, Ozolmuiža.

On August 17, army troops with the forces of five divisions attacked enemy positions, crossed R. Arona and began to develop an offensive in a northwestern direction. August 18 released several settlements southwest of Madona, and the advanced units of the 5th Panzer Corps, having overcome 30 km, broke into Ergli district.

Only by the end of August, as a result of many days and stubborn battles, the troops of the 3rd shock army reached the Ergli region and to the south of it. The situation stabilized and the 3rd shock army received the task of gaining a foothold on the achieved line.

In the Riga operation of the 3rd shock army, a responsible task was assigned: to break through the enemy’s defenses on section August, Ozolmuiža, in cooperation with the 42nd and 22nd armies, defeat its units north of the Western Dvina river and master abroad Taurupe, Mengele. In the future, advance along railway Ergli - Riga and go out to Marciena district, Madliena.

On September 13, the troops of the 3rd shock army regrouped and took up their starting position for the offensive; on September 14, the offensive began. The troops of the 3rd Shock Army broke through the enemy defenses on a narrow 5-kilometer front. By the end of September 18, as a result of heavy fighting, it was possible to push the enemy back and reach Ogre river. On the night of September 22, hiding behind the rearguards, the enemy withdrew his troops to the western coast rivers Lichupe and Ogre and switched to mobile defense.

On September 24, the 3rd shock army received a new task: to regroup in area southwest of Mitava (Jelgava) and change formations of the 51st Army of the 1st Baltic Front there.

From September 28 to October 3, 1944, the troops of the 3rd shock army marched to a new area and changed the formations of the 51st army to at the turn of Mitava, Gardena, Besnier. The army received the task of firmly holding the defensive zone, concentrating its main efforts in Mitava area and Dobele, by October 15, complete the equipment of the cut-off defensive line along the line Dobele, Auce, Kalnamuiža; to provide a junction with the 1st Baltic Front. On the right, the 22nd Army was defending, on the left, the 51st Army of the 1st Baltic Front.

On October 10, the 3rd shock army received a directive from the front to prepare for the transition to the offensive to defeat the enemy’s Courland grouping together with the 42nd army in general towards Saldus, Libava (Liepaja), the immediate task was to break through the enemy defenses and seize abroad Biksta,Auce. The start of the offensive was scheduled for 16 October. On the right, the 22nd Army was to operate, on the left, the 4th Shock Army of the 1st Baltic Front.

On October 12, tasks were set, the 79th and 100th rifle corps were to strike at general direction on Marberg, oz. Zebres, defeat the opposing enemy forces and advance to a depth of 15-17 km.

On October 16, after a short artillery preparation, the army troops went on the offensive. Overcoming stubborn resistance, they broke through the main and intermediate lines of defense and began to slowly move forward with battles. The enemy resisted fiercely. During October 17 and 18, he brought the 24th Infantry Division into battle from the reserve, so the 79th and 100th Rifle Corps in the following days had to fight stubborn battles with counterattacking units of the 24th and 93rd Infantry Divisions, supported by " tigers" and "ferdinands" of the SS tank brigade "Gross". On October 19, fierce battles were fought in all sectors of the front, as a result of which the enemy managed to push our units somewhat by the end of that day.

On the morning of October 20, the commander of the 3rd shock army brought into battle the 7th rifle corps, which had been included in the army by the start of the offensive, but this did not lead to the desired result. As a result of fierce bloody battles, by the end of October 21, they managed to advance only 5-6 kilometers.

On October 21, the 3rd shock army surrendered the occupied zone of the 22nd army and, by the end of October 23, made a night march to area east of Vegeriai here to prepare an offensive in a new direction. The 100th Rifle Corps was ordered to be transferred to Debele area 22nd Army, and instead of it, the 14th Guards Rifle Corps was included in the 3rd Shock Army.

In the period from October 22 to 26, the army regrouped its forces in a new direction and prepared for the operation, and on the morning of October 27, it went on the offensive from Vegeriai district in northwest towards Saldus. At that time, it included the 7th, 79th and 14th Guards Rifle Corps.

The army struck north of Vegeriai forces of two corps with the task of breaking through the enemy defenses on section Jurgashi, Vegeriai, destroy the opposing enemy and, advancing around Auce from the south, in cooperation with the 10th Guards Army, by the end of the first day of the operation, capture abroad Kevele, Rumbeneki. In the future, attack Ozolmuizhu. The 7th Rifle Corps operated on the right flank, with the 364th and 265th Rifle Divisions in the first echelon. To the left of it, the 79th Rifle Corps advanced, having the 150th and 171st Rifle Divisions in the first echelon. The 14th Guards Rifle Corps was tasked with a strong defense to prevent the enemy from breaking through in the southern and southeastern directions and with units of the 146th Rifle Division to strike in the area Vegeriai, Šilos towards Beleniai.

The 33rd Infantry Division remained in the army reserve. From the very beginning, the fighting in the Vegeriai direction took on a fierce character. They were hard, exhausting, passed under almost continuous autumn rain. The greatest success was indicated in the offensive zone of the 150th Infantry Division. The enemy continued to put up stubborn resistance. In order to complete the breakthrough of its defenses, on the night of October 28, the second echelons of the corps, the 198th and 207th rifle divisions, were brought into battle.

By the end of October 31, the army troops, waging continuous battles and repelling counterattacks, advanced 25-30 km, captured dozens of settlements, including the city of Vegeriai, and the formations of the 7th Rifle Corps approached an important node of the enemy defense - Auce.

Attempts by the army troops in the first days of November to continue the offensive did not give the desired results, the enemy troops, being in the Courland cauldron, had heavily compacted battle formations and offered fierce resistance.

3rd shock army, entrenched in at the turn of Pulyas, Jaunsergi, Mezhmali, continued to conduct defensive battles to block the Courland grouping of the enemy until the end of November 1944, and on December 15 it was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

On December 31, the army was included in the 1st Belorussian Front. In 1945, army troops participated in the Warsaw-Poznan, East Pomeranian and Berlin strategic offensive operations. Soldiers of the 79th Rifle Corps of the Army hoisted the Banner of Victory over the Reichstag.

After the completion of hostilities in Berlin on May 2, 1945, the army troops participated in the disarmament of the remnants of the German Berlin garrison. After the end of the war, she was part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, headquarters - Magdeburg.

In 1954, the 3rd Shock Army was renamed the 3rd Combined Arms Army. On January 15, 1974, the 3rd Combined Arms Army was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In 1990, the division was withdrawn from the GDR, with the disbandment of the formation.

Army commanders:

  • Lieutenant General Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev December 1941 to August 1942
  • Lieutenant General Galitsky Kuzma Nikitovich September 1942 to November 1943
  • Colonel General Chibisov Nikandr Evlampievich November 1943 to April 1944
  • Lieutenant General Yushkevich Vasily Alexandrovich April to August 1944
  • Lieutenant General Gerasimov Mikhail Nikanorovich August to October 1944
  • Major General Simonyak Nikolay Pavlovich October 1944 to March 1945
  • Colonel General Kuznetsov Vasily Ivanovich March 1945 to 1948

Members of the Army War Council:

  • Brigadier Commissar Ryazanov A.P. December 1941 to February 1943
  • Lieutenant General Ponomarenko Panteleimon Kondratievich February to March 1943
  • Major General Litvinov Andrey Ivanovich March 1943 to May 9, 1945

Army Chiefs of Staff:

  • Major General Pokrovsky A.P. December 1941 to February 1942
  • Major General Sharokhin Mikhail Nikolaevich February to August 1942
  • Major General Yudintsev Ivan Semyonovich from August 1942 to March 1943
  • Major General Busarov Mikhail Mikhailovich March to May 1943
  • Major General Fyodor Andreevich from May to October 1943
  • Major General Beilin Veniamin Lvovich October 1943 to August 1944
  • Lieutenant General Bukshtynovich M. F. from August 1944 to May 1946

Compound:

Composition of the army

June to December 1944

Rifles, airborne troops and cavalry

  • 7th Rifle Corps - since October 1944
    • 23rd Guards rifle division - from November to December 15, 1944
    • 33rd Rifle Division - from Decemberto December 15, 1944
    • 198th Rifle Division - from October to November 1944
    • 265th Rifle Division - from November 1944
    • 364th Rifle Division - from November to December 1944
  • 12th Guards rifle corps - from December 1944
    • 52nd Guards rifle division - from December 1944
    • 364th Rifle Division - from December to December 15, 1944
  • 14th Guards rifle corps - from October to December 12, 1944
    • 33rd Rifle Division - to December 1944
    • 198th Rifle Division - from November to December 1944
    • 379th Rifle Division
  • 44th Rifle Corps - from August to September 1944
    • 115th Rifle Division
  • 79th Rifle Corps
  • 93rd Rifle Corps - for July to September 1944
    • 219th Rifle Division - for July to September 1944
    • 379th Rifle Division - for July to September 1944
    • 391st Rifle Division - from July to August 1944
  • 100th Rifle Corps - from September to December 1944
    • 21st Guards rifle division - from September to December 1944
    • 28th Rifle Division - from September to December 1944
    • 200th Rifle Division - from September to December 1944
  • 827th howitzer artillery regiment - for July to October 1944
  • 6th Guards anti-tank artillery brigade - from November to December 15 1944
    • 318th Guards. anti-tank artillery regiment - for July to August 1944
  • 18th anti-tank artillery brigade - since Novemberto December 15, 1944
    • 171st anti-tank artillery regiment - from October to November 1944
  • 163rd Guards. anti-tank artillery regiment
  • 4th Mortar Brigade
    • 193rd Mortar Regiment - from September to October 1944
  • 203rd Guards horse-drawn mortar regiment
  • 14th Guards rocket artillery mortar brigade - since Novemberto December 15, 1944
  • 85th Guards. rocket artillery mortar regiment - from September to October, from Novemberto December 15, 1944
  • 93rd Guards. rocket artillery mortar regiment - for July to September, from Octoberto December 15, 1944
  • 310th Guards. rocket artillery mortar regiment - for July to August 1944
  • 36th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division of the RGK - for Julyto December 15, 1944
    • 1385th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 1391st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment
    • 1397th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 1399th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
  • 1622nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment
  • 467th Separate Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion - for Julyto December 15, 1944

Armored and mechanized troops

  • 29th Guards tank brigade - for July to September 1944
  • 31st Guards separate tank regiment - since Novemberto December 15, 1944
  • 227th Separate Tank Regiment - from August to September 1944
  • 239th Separate Tank Regiment - from August to September 1944
  • 373rd Guards. heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - from August to September 1944
  • 1539th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - for July to August 1944
  • 991st self-propelled artillery regiment - from August to September 1944
  • 999th self-propelled artillery regiment - from September to November, from Decemberto December 15, 1944
  • 1476th self-propelled artillery regiment - from September to December 1944
  • 56th separate division of armored trains - for Julyto December 15, 1944
  • 57th separate division of armored trains - for Julyto December 15, 1944
  • 62nd separate division of armored trains - for Julyto December 15, 1944

Engineering Troops

  • 8th motor engineering brigade - from September to October 1944
  • 19th Assault Engineer Brigade - to July 1944
  • 25th Engineer Brigade
  • 924th separate sapper battalion - since Novemberto December 15, 1944
  • 54th Pontoon Bridge Battalion - from November to December 1944
  • 88th Pontoon Bridge Battalion - from August to October 1944

Flamethrower parts

  • 206th separate company of knapsack flamethrowers - from September to October 1944

Source

“THIRD STRIKING. BATTLE PATH OF THE 3rd STRIK ARMY" Order of the Red Banner of Labor MILITARY PUBLISHING HOUSE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR MOSCOW - 1976

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